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71 
SET THE STATUTES STRAIGHT: AMENDING 
THE LANHAM ACT TO DISPEL THE CONFUSION 
REGARDING REVERSE CONFUSION 
INNA KAMINER* 
 
The typical case of alleged trademark infringement, i.e., “forward 
confusion,” involves a larger and more established “senior user” and a 
smaller and less powerful “junior user.”  The secondary junior user 
wrongfully uses the first senior user’s mark as its own, and thus benefits 
from the senior user’s more established goodwill.  In ruling on a senior 
user’s trademark infringement claim, the court will use a set of “likelihood 
of confusion” factors to determine if consumers are confusing the junior 
user’s goods for that of the senior.  Each circuit’s factors vary, but they are 
harmonious.  The issue that this Note explores is the difficult and 
counterintuitive doctrine of reverse confusion. 
Reverse confusion occurs when the junior user of a mark is larger and 
more powerful than the senior user.  As the stronger secondary entity, the 
junior user is able to flood the market with advertisements about its good or 
service, and consumers purchase the senior user’s product upon the 
mistaken belief that it is that of the junior user. 
 At first, courts did not see the harm in reverse confusion.  The less 
reputable senior user reaps a profit after all—what is the problem?  The 
problem is that the senior user has spent time and money in branding its 
goods or services with a mark that the senior user wants to indicate as its 
source.  When a powerful junior user adopts that mark, consumers believe 
that the mark indicates the junior user as the source of the goods, rather 
than the true smaller entity.  This confusion harms the senior user’s 
goodwill and reputation. 
 Although all federal courts now recognize the doctrine of reverse 
confusion and the harm it imposes, this Note describes how far the courts 
                                                          
 *J.D. candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2016; University of California, Irvine 
undergraduate.  A special thanks to Professor Justin Hughes, whose teachings have grown my 
love of copyright from a kindle to a burning flame, and without whose comments and guidance, 
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have come and how far they still have yet to go.  There is no coherent test, 
and the likelihood of confusion analysis in forward confusion does not 
outright apply in reverse confusion cases due to the inverse power 
relationship between the parties.  Because the senior user is the weaker 
entity in a reverse confusion case, certain likelihood of confusion factors 
should be analyzed differently to take this into account.  For example, in a 
typical forward confusion case the court considers the inherent and 
commercial strength of the senior user’s mark.  The stronger the mark, the 
greater the likelihood of confusion.  If this analysis were to directly apply 
in reverse confusion, where the junior user is by definition the stronger 
entity, every senior user would lose on the strength of the mark factor.  
Therefore, the analysis in reverse confusion should be changed to consider 
the strength of the junior user’s mark and its relative likelihood of 
confusion.  Discreet, but consequential, modifications such as this will 
correct the likelihood of confusion analysis to ensure a consistent and just 
result in reverse confusion cases.  Furthermore, this Note posits that 
legislative action is needed to statutorily define a uniform test. 
Part I of this Note introduces the problematic realm of reverse 
confusion faced by the courts.  Part II begins with the public policies 
underlying trademark law and explains a viable trademark infringement 
claim under the Lanham Act.  Part III addresses consumer confusion in 
both the traditional forward confusion cases and reverse confusion cases.  
Additionally, Part III also discusses the inherent confusion and lack of 
clarity caused by inconsistent circuit court approaches.  Part IV argues why 
reverse confusion is an important, separate, actionable claim.  Lastly, Part 
V concludes that legislative action is needed to dispel the confusion 
regarding reverse confusion in the courts and sets forth the principles to 
adopt in amending the Lanham Act. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine this: you open a business, create a great product, find a 
catchy name, register it as a trademark, and enjoy considerable success as a 
result.  Your product hits the marketplace and receives recognition; this 
product, called “Guys & Dolls,” is your livelihood!  One day, a new entity 
uses the name “Guys & Dolls” on its product.  This new entity of “Guys & 
Dolls” (the “Junior User”) is larger and financially greater than your small, 
but reputable company.  The Junior User floods the market with 
advertisements for its new product.  Next thing you know, its product is 
flying off the shelves and consumers are coming to you for the Junior 
User’s product.  Naturally, you inform the consumers that you do not carry 
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the Junior User’s “Guys & Dolls.”  Rather, your “Guys & Dolls” is a 
completely different product.  Because you do not carry the Junior User’s 
product, consumers feel cheated and leave you nasty reviews.  But whom 
did you cheat? 
Legally, you did nothing wrong.  You created a product, found a 
creative name, received trademark registration, and used it for years before 
this Junior User ever entered the market with the same name.  Still, your 
business, your name, and your very livelihood are now at stake.  So, you 
decide to file suit for trademark infringement.  The court, however, 
concludes that your claim is not viable because unlike a typical trademark 
infringement case, you are dealing with a case of reverse confusion.  
Unlike a typical forward confusion claim, where the senior user is the 
stronger entity, a reverse confusion claim involves a stronger junior entity.1  
Why should your business suffer simply because it is the weaker entity?  
This Note will address this very issue. 
The Lanham Act (“the Act”) governs federal trademark protection.2  
Creating two statutory bases for any confusion-based claim, the Act 
provides for nationwide protection of a trademark against threats, such as 
the unauthorized reproduction or imitation of a trademark that is “likely to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”3  A trademark 
protectable under the Lanham Act is: 
 
[A]ny word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof—(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona 
fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the 
principal register established by this Act, to identify and 
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from 
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source 
                                                          
1.  Nancy Del Pizzo, Comment, Developing a Uniform Test for “Reverse Confusion” 
Trademark Cases in the Sports & Entertainment Industries, 14 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 
175, 175 (2004).  
 
2.  Lanham (Trademark) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2012).  
 
3.  Christina P. Mott, Note, Multifactors, Multiconfusion?  Refining “Likelihood of 
Confusion” Factors for Reverse-Confusion Trademark Infringement Claims to Achieve More 
Consistent and Predictable Results, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 422 & n.6 (2014) (explaining 
that section 32(1)(a) [15 U.S.C. § 1114] of the Lanham Act provides for remedies for 
infringement of registered trademarks, while section 43(a) [15 U.S.C. § 1125] of the Act is a 
parallel cause of action applying to unregistered rights); see 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012) (section 32 
of the Lanham Act); Id. § 1125 (section 43 of the Lanham Act). 
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of the goods, even if that source is unknown.4 
 
In order to recover damages or injunctive relief in a trademark 
infringement case, the court generally looks at (1) the inherent strength of 
the mark and (2) the likelihood of consumer confusion.5  In a typical 
likelihood of confusion case, known as “forward confusion,” the first or 
senior user alleges that a secondary or junior user is using the senior user’s 
mark, thus trading off the typically larger and more established senior 
user’s public goodwill.6  Take, for example, a Louis Vuitton knock-off 
emblazoned with “LV”: such a purse sold by a junior user will lead 
consumers to believe the product actually comes from the senior user, 
Louis Vuitton, because it bears the “LV” symbol.  In reverse confusion, 
however, the senior user is the smaller and less powerful entity, alleging 
that the large and powerful junior user has confused the public as to the 
source of the product.7  Misperceiving the source of a product harms the 
senior trademark holder’s goodwill by diminishing the value of its mark.8  
Consider the following example: 
 
The plaintiff (senior user) makes widgets for a niche market 
segment under Brand B.  Most widget-buyers have never heard 
of the plaintiff or of Brand B.  The defendant (junior user) is a 
major, national widget manufacturer, well-known to the entire 
widget-buying population.  The defendant launches a national 
advertising campaign introducing its new waterproof widget, 
which it calls the B Widget.  Everyone is suddenly aware of B 
                                                          
4.  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012); see also David D. Mouery, Comment, Trademark Law and 
the Bottom Line – Coke Is It!, 2 BARRY L. REV. 107, 108–09 (2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995). 
 
5.  See 111 MALLA POLLACK, AM. JUR. TRIALS § 10 (2009); see also Mott, supra note 3, 
at 435 (“The Act requires proving two factors before liability may attach: first, the mark must 
merit protection and second, the defendant’s use of the same or similar mark has caused a 
likelihood of confusion in the marketplace.”). 
 
6.  Del Pizzo, supra note 1, at 175.  
 
7.  Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Reverse Confusion Doctrine Under Lanham 
Trademark Act, 187 A.L.R. FED. 271 (2003) (discussing the differences between forward and 
reverse confusion and how the issue is fundamentally the same in both: whether a consumer 
would be confused as to the source of the products). 
 
8.  Id. at 287. 
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Widgets.  New potential customers who come across the 
plaintiff’s Brand B widgets think that the plaintiff is mimicking 
the defendant.9   
 
Until 1977, no court had held reverse confusion to be actionable.10  
Even thereafter, when the Third Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged 
the doctrine of reverse confusion in 1994, its own district courts had 
refused to recognize such claims.11  While circuit courts now recognize 
reverse confusion claims, the factors that apply vary from circuit to circuit, 
giving rise to inconsistencies.12  Absent a definitive verdict by the Supreme 
Court establishing a succinct test, confusion regarding reverse confusion 
continues to grow.13  This Note argues that, given the level of incertitude, a 
judicially created test is not enough.  Uniformity and clarification require 
legislative action to (1) make clear that reverse confusion is a separate, 
actionable claim under the Lanham Act and (2) set forth the elements 
required to prove a reverse confusion claim. 
Part II of this Note begins with the public policies underlying 
trademark law and explains a viable trademark infringement claim under 
the Lanham Act.  Part III addresses consumer confusion in both the 
traditional forward confusion cases and reverse confusion cases.  
Additionally, Part III also discusses the inherent confusion and lack of 
                                                          
9.  POLLACK, supra note 5, § 7. 
  
10.  See Leah L. Scholer, Note, Righting the Wrong in Reverse Confusion, 55 HASTINGS 
L.J. 737, 747 (2004) (“The first court case to recognize reverse confusion as an actionable theory 
was Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. in 1977.”); see also Big O Tire 
Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1372 (10th Cir. 1977); Buckman, 
supra note 7, at 288 (noting that the concept of reverse confusion, though not the designation, 
was recognized in 1918). 
 
11.  Del Pizzo, supra note 1, at 188 (“Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals set 
forth these three promising exceptions for ‘reverse confusion’ cases, it is most disturbing that 
district courts within the circuit hearing ‘reverse confusion’ cases after the Circuit’s lead case 
disregarded Circuit precedent.”). 
 
12.  See id. at 186–202 (discussing several circuit courts’ analyses and the different factors 
that each circuit uses in analyzing a reverse confusion case, thus causing confusion due to the lack 
of a uniform test); see also Scholer, supra note 10, at 739 (“In direct and reverse confusion cases, 
courts use varied multifactor tests to determine whether a ‘likelihood of confusion’ exists between 
the senior and junior users’ marks.”).  
 
13.  See Scholer, supra note 10, at 748 (“Although courts have grown more comfortable 
with the reverse confusion cause of action, not one has articulated an appropriate standard for 
fashioning a complete remedy under the Lanham Act.”). 
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clarity caused by inconsistent circuit court approaches.  Part IV argues why 
reverse confusion is an important, separate, actionable claim.  Lastly, Part 
V concludes that legislative action is needed to dispel the confusion 
regarding reverse confusion in the courts and sets forth the principles to 
adopt in amending the Lanham Act. 
II. BRIEF BACKGROUND 
A. The Purposes of Trademark Protection 
Trademark protection serves two primary purposes.14  First, 
trademarks prevent the use of identical or similar marks in the marketplace, 
which may confuse the consuming public as to the actual source of the 
goods.15  Second, trademarks “protect the goodwill that companies have 
built up in their trademarks.”16  “Congress recognized two groups who need 
trademark protection, consumers and trademark owners.  Trademark 
protection assures that consumers receive an item from the intended 
originator, and that trademark owners retain the value of the resources they 
commit to building their mark and associated goodwill without others 
misappropriating their mark.”17  As a result, the public is protected from 
gimmicks “passed off” as the source of another’s work product, and 
manufacturers are protected from unauthentic attempts to use their name to 
indicate false source.18  Based on these public policies behind trademark 
protection, then, logic reasons that even if the senior user is the weaker 
user, its goodwill should still be protected against a stronger junior user. 
B. The Lanham Act 
The Lanham Act, enacted in 1946, “codifies the law of trademarks 
[and] protects the consuming public from confusion about the source of 
                                                          
14.  Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Reverse Confusion Doctrine Under Lanham 
Trademark Act, 187 A.L.R. FED. 271, 286 (2003). 
 
15.  Id.  
 
16.  Id.  
 
17.  Leah L. Scholer, Note, Righting the Wrong in Reverse Confusion, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 
737, 742 (2004) (citing S. REP. NO. 1333, at 3 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 
1274).  
 
18.  See id. at 742; see also Buckman, supra note 14, at 288. 
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products and services.”19  “Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act20 prohibits, 
among other things, the use of any false designation of origin in connection 
with goods or services which is likely to cause confusion as to the origin of 
a person’s goods or services.”21  In order to have an infringement claim 
under the Lanham Act, there must be a protectable mark and a likelihood of 
consumer confusion.22   
Plaintiffs in trademark infringement cases must first prove they have 
rights to the mark to show that the mark is protectable.23  To do so, the 
plaintiff must either produce a registration for the mark at issue on the 
principle register of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”)24 or, for unregistered marks, prove common law rights.25  
Common law rights are established by showing that the mark has been used 
in commerce and proving that the mark is either “inherently distinctive” or 
has otherwise acquired “secondary meaning.”26  Generally, marks are 
characterized using the Abercrombie scale, in order of ascending 
protectability: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) fanciful, 
                                                          
19.  Buckman, supra note 14, at 271. 
 
20.  15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).  
 
21.  Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Application of Doctrine of “Reverse Passing Off” 
Under Lanham Act, 194 A.L.R. FED. 175, 175 (2004) (“One type of conduct may constitute a 
false designation of origin—‘reverse passing off’ or ‘reverse palming off’—which occurs when a 
producer misrepresents someone else’s goods or services as his or her goods or services.”). 
 
22.  111 MALLA POLLACK, AM. JUR. TRIALS § 10 (2009); see also Christina P. Mott, 
Note, Multifactors, Multiconfusion?  Refining “Likelihood of Confusion” Factors for Reverse-
Confusion Trademark Infringement Claims to Achieve More Consistent and Predictable Results, 
47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 435 (2014) (“The Act requires proving two factors before liability 
may attach: first, the mark must merit protection and second, the defendant’s use of the same or 
similar mark has caused a likelihood of confusion in the marketplace.”).  
 
23.  See POLLACK, supra note 22. 
 
24.  See Eric G. Shupin, Trademark Law Finally Showing its Age in the Federal Circuit: 
Senior Versus Junior Users in the Battle of Reverse Confusion, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 87, 92 (2013) 
(illustrating that, although registering a trademark with the USPTO is not required, the benefits of 
doing so include “public notice of ownership of the mark; the ‘exclusive right to use the mark 
nationwide on or in connection with the goods [and] services’ associated with the trademark; 
[and] the ‘ability to bring an action concerning the mark in federal court . . . .’”). 
 
25.  POLLACK, supra note 22, § 11.  
 
26.  Id. 
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and/or arbitrary.27  Generic words have no protection as a mark.28  If a word 
is deemed descriptive in this context, then it is not inherently distinctive, 
but may still be protectable if it acquires a secondary meaning over time.29  
“Secondary meaning” is an automatic association in the consumer’s mind 
between a mark and the source of the good or product it represents.30  
Secondary meaning is usually gained over time at the cost of the 
manufacturer’s marketing and advertising expenses to ensure that 
consumers associate this manufacturer with this particular product.31  
Fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive marks are afforded the highest 
protection.32  Once a plaintiff proves the rights to the mark, the next step is 
proving a likelihood of consumer confusion.33 
                                                          
27.  Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(creating the four classes of trademarks); accord. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 
763, 768 (1992) (upholding the Abercrombie classification, but splitting the last “arbitrary or 
fanciful” category into categories four and five, “arbitrary” and “fanciful”); see also Mott, supra 
note 22, at 436–37 (explaining that the Abercrombie court first established the four-category 
classification system, which the Two Pesos court later upheld but split into five categories).  
 
28.  2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 12:1 (4th ed. 2015). 
  
29.  See Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1060–61 (7th Cir. 
1995) (explaining that a descriptive term can become a protectable trademark if it has become 
distinctive; this acquisition of distinctiveness is referred to as “secondary meaning”; and 
secondary meaning is a mental association in consumers’ minds between the asserted trademark 
and a single source of the product). 
 
30.  See id. 
 
31.  Nancy Del Pizzo, Comment, Developing a Uniform Test for “Reverse Confusion” 
Trademark Cases in the Sports & Entertainment Industries, 14 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 
175, 180 (2004). 
 
32.  Molly S. Cusson, Note, Reverse Confusion: Modifying the Polaroid Factors to 
Achieve Consistent Results, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 179, 191–92 (1995) 
(“Arbitrary, fanciful or suggestive marks are afforded the highest level of protection, whereas 
generic names are not considered ‘marks’ and are therefore unprotectable.”). 
 
33.  See Thad G. Long & Alfred M. Marks, Reverse Confusion: Fundamentals and Limits, 
84 TRADEMARK REP. 1, 1–2 (1994) (“To succeed on a trademark infringement claim under the 
Lanham Act, plaintiff must show a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods at issue. . 
. . Likelihood of confusion exists when consumers viewing the mark would probably assume that 
the product or service it represents is associated with the source of a different product or service 
identified by a similar mark.”). 
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III. AY, THERE’S THE RUB: CONSUMER CONFUSION 
Whether there is a likelihood of consumer confusion as to the source 
of the goods at issue is the seminal question in trademark infringement 
cases.  There are two types of consumer confusion: forward and reverse.34 
A. Forward Confusion 
“Forward or direct confusion results when a consumer mistakenly 
believes that the junior user’s products are produced by or associated with 
the senior user.”35  The typical test for forward confusion is the Polaroid 
test.36  The Polaroid factors are: (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s 
trademark; (2) the similarity between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks; 
(3) the proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood that the senior owner 
will bridge the gap; (5) evidence of actual confusion; (6) the sophistication 
of the buyers; (7) the defendant’s good faith in adopting its mark; and (8) 
the quality of the defendant’s product.37  The circuit courts of appeal, 
however, have each taken the test and altered it to their own accord; thus, 
each circuit’s factors are slightly different.38  “[T]he ultimate question 
remains whether relevant consumers are likely to believe that the products 
or services offered by the parties are affiliated in some way.”39 
                                                          
34.  Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Reverse Confusion Doctrine Under Lanham 
Trademark Act, 187 A.L.R. FED. 271, 287 (2003). 
 
35.  Leah L. Scholer, Note, Righting the Wrong in Reverse Confusion, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 
737, 737 (2004). 
 
36.  Although each circuit has its own variance of the Polaroid factors, this Note will use 
the Polaroid factors (referring to the first factors set forth for likelihood of confusion) for the sake 
of consistency. 
 
37.  Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).  
 
38.  See Nancy Del Pizzo, Comment, Developing a Uniform Test for “Reverse Confusion” 
Trademark Cases in the Sports & Entertainment Industries, 14 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 
175, 181 (“While Polaroid is considered the landmark decision on this issue for its enunciation of 
an eight-factor likelihood of confusion test, even the Polaroid court posited that other factors may 
be taken into account to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion in a forward 
confusion case.  As a result, various circuit courts have created their own tests, which while 
sometimes featuring fewer or more factors than those specified in Polaroid, remain fairly uniform 
in purpose.”).  
 
39.  88 ELEANOR L. GROSSMAN, OHIO JUR. § 148 (3d ed. 2015) (citing Future Lawn, Inc. 
v. Maumee Bay Landscape Contractors, L.L.C., 542 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (N.D. Ohio 2008)). 
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1. Analyzing the Forward Confusion Factors 
The Second Circuit nicely detailed how to analyze the Polaroid 
factors of a typical confusion case in Sports Authority, Inc. v. Prime 
Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955 (2d Cir. 1996).  As to the first factor—the 
strength of the mark—the Sports Authority court stated that the strength of 
a plaintiff’s mark is decided by its inherent distinctiveness as determined 
using the Abercrombie scale,40 as well as by its commercial distinctiveness 
of the plaintiff’s mark in the marketplace.41  A registered mark is 
“presumed to be distinctive and should be afforded the utmost 
protection.”42  However, acquired distinctiveness is also important.43 
Because the strength of a trademark for the purposes of likelihood of 
confusion depends on “the interplay between conceptual and commercial 
strength,” inherent distinctiveness cannot be the only inquiry.44  The longer 
a mark has been prominently used in commerce, the greater the likelihood 
that consumers will recognize it as indicating the origin of a good.45  
Consumer confusion results when a mark that has been long used to 
designate the source of one origin is used on another.46  Typically, evidence 
of the commercial strength of a mark includes how long the mark has been 
used, the type and amount of advertising used to promote the mark, the 
prominence of the mark in advertising, the volume of sales, the area where 
                                                          
40.  Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9 (creating the four classes of trademarks: generic, 
descriptive, arbitrary and fanciful); accord. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768 (upholding the 
Abercrombie classification, but splitting the fourth category of ‘arbitrary and fanciful’ into 
categories four and five, ‘arbitrary’ and ‘fanciful’).  
 
41.  See Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 962 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(stating that a mark’s “independent indicia of strength” is relevant to deciding whether the 
strength of the mark weighs in favor or against finding a likelihood of confusion under Polaroid); 
Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 182 (describing how the court in Sports Authority examined the 
Polaroid factor of the strength of the mark). 
 
42.  E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio Del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 462 (N.D. Cal. 
1991). 
 
43.  Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2003).  
 
44.  Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 679 F.3d 410, 419 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
 
45.  Virgin Enters., 335 F.3d at 148. 
 
46.  Id. 
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the sales occur, “unsolicited media recognition of the mark, and dictionary 
listings of the word as a brand name.”47 
As to the second Polaroid factor—the similarity of the marks—courts 
examine the look, sound, and meaning of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
marks, as well as how the marks are used.48  The marks must be compared 
in their entirety.49  If both marks are identical, then the manner in which the 
parties use the marks is of greatest significance to this factor.50  In deciding 
whether the marks are similarly used, courts look at how the marks are 
presented in the marketplace.51  Side-by-side comparisons are not used to 
distinguish the marks; rather, marks are compared in terms of the “overall 
commercial impression” that confusion as to the source of the goods or 
services offered under the respective marks is likely to result.52 
As to the third Polaroid factor—the proximity of the products—the 
Sports Authority court explained that this factor inspects the relationship 
between the channels through which the plaintiff and defendant buy or sell 
their product.53  Courts consider whether the products compete directly and 
whether they share the same marketing channel.54  Consumers are less 
likely to be confused when two users of a similar mark operate in wholly 
different markets, because there is no assumption that “their similarly 
branded products come from the same source.”55  For example, no 
consumer would reasonably assume that Ferrari brand cars are associated 
                                                          
47.  111 MALLA POLLACK, AM. JUR. TRIALS § 15 (2009). 
 
48.  E. & J. Gallo Winery, 782 F. Supp. at 463. 
 
49.  POLLACK, supra note 47, § 16. 
 
50.  See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §§ 23:59, 23:60 (4th ed. 2015). 
 
51.  Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 962. 
 
52.  MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 23:59 & n.1 (citing Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph 
Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); see also Louis Vuitton Malletier v. 
Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding the trial court inappropriately 
focused on the similarity of the marks in a side-by-side comparison instead of viewing them in 
the overall context of the marketplace).  
 
53.  Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 963. 
 
54.  Id. 
 
55.  Virgin Enters., 335 F.3d at 150. 
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with Ferrari brand apples because those two products are completely 
unrelated.  However, when the two users’ marks operate in close areas of 
commerce, the consumer is more likely to mistake the second user’s goods 
as coming from the first user.56  For example, it would be reasonable for a 
consumer to be confused in believing that Ferrari brand cars are associated 
with Ferrari brand motorcycles because those products are at least 
somewhat related. 
As to the fourth Polaroid factor—the likelihood that the senior user 
will bridge the gap—courts look at the likelihood that the plaintiff will 
enter defendant’s primary business area.57  In determining this likelihood, 
the court can further examine how likely “the average customer would 
perceive” the plaintiff would enter the defendant’s business.58  The more 
likely a plaintiff is to enter into the defendant’s business area using its 
mark, the more likely consumers are to be confused as to the source of the 
mark’s goods.59  The absence of an intent to bridge the gap, however, does 
not negate a finding of a likelihood of confusion.60 
As to the fifth Polaroid factor—evidence of actual consumer 
confusion—the Sports Authority court explored whether the defendant’s 
use of the mark may cause the plaintiff commercial injury.61  In addition to 
evidence of loss of sales, commercial injury is also determined by whether 
the defendant’s use of the mark will “confuse[] the public into believing 
that the plaintiff actually sponsors [the] defendant’s products.”62  “Actual 
confusion is normally proven through the use of direct evidence, i.e., 
testimony from members of the buying public, as well as through 
circumstantial evidence, e.g., consumer surveys or consumer reaction 
tests.”63  Misdirected phone calls and results of consumer surveys are 
                                                          
56.  Id. 
 
57.  Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 183 (describing how the court in Sports Authority 
examined the Polaroid factor of bridging the gap). 
 
58.  Id. 
 
59.  Id. 
 
60.  Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987).  
 
61.  See Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 963. 
 
62.  Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 183–84 (describing how the court in Sports Authority 
examined the Polaroid factor of actual confusion). 
 
63.  Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  
SET THE STATUTES STRAIGHT  (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2016  5:22 PM 
2015] SET THE STATUTES STRAIGHT 83 
evidence that the plaintiff lost control over how the public perceives its 
product.64  However, in First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Council 
Bluffs v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Lincoln, the circuit court 
explained that while surveys are direct and persuasive evidence of 
customer confusion, the court has never held that “such a survey is an 
essential ingredient of a successful service-mark or trademark claim.”65  In 
fact, it is “black letter law” that to prevail on a trademark infringement 
claim, actual confusion need not be shown.66 
As to the sixth Polaroid factor—the sophistication of the buyers—the 
less sophisticated the buyers are of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s products, 
the more confusion is likely to exist.67  However, “while price differences 
are important in determining the sophistication of customers, they are not 
dispositive.”68  The general impression of the ordinary purchaser under 
normal purchasing conditions is assessed to examine the level of consumer 
sophistication in purchasing choices.69  An ordinary purchaser, particularly 
one that buys inexpensive items on impulse, is most likely to be confused 
by similar marks.70 
As to the seventh Polaroid factor—the defendant’s good faith in 
adopting its mark—the issue is whether the defendant chose its mark with 
the intention of capitalizing on the plaintiff’s goodwill and reputation.71  
This may include the defendant’s adoption of a mark similar to plaintiff’s 
mark with the intent to confuse consumers, thus benefiting from the 
                                                          
64.  Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 184 (describing how the court in Sports Authority 
examined the Polaroid factor of actual confusion). 
 
65.  First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Council Bluffs v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of 
Lincoln, 929 F.2d 382, 384–85 (8th Cir. 1991).  
 
66.  Best Cellars Inc. v. Grape Finds at Dupont, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 431, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000).  
 
67.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 23:95. 
 
68.  Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 399 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 
69.  Sports Auth., 89 F.3d at 965.  
 
70.  See Rich Stim, Likelihood of Confusion: How Do You Determine If a Trademark is 
Infringing?, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/likelihood-confusion-how-do-you-
determine-trademark-infringing.html [http://perma.cc/TQE4-5CUU]. 
 
71.  Best Cellars, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 457. 
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plaintiff’s goodwill.72  Other considerations include whether the 
defendant’s mark is reflective of its product, whether the defendant 
conducted a trademark search prior to adoption of the mark, and whether 
defendant relied on legal advice in choosing its mark.73  Intentional copying 
gives rise to a presumption of bad faith.74  Further, constructive knowledge 
may signal bad faith.75  Many courts have stated that the junior user has a 
“duty” to name and dress his good or service as to avoid consumer 
confusion with the senior user’s product.76 
As to the eighth and final Polaroid factor—the quality of defendant’s 
product—the court looks at whether the junior user’s product is of inferior 
quality as compared to the plaintiff’s product.77  This factor is primarily 
concerned with whether the senior user’s reputation could be jeopardized 
by virtue of the fact that the junior user’s product is of inferior quality.78  A 
plaintiff must provide evidence that the defendant’s products are in fact 
inferior as compared to plaintiff’s product.79 
2. Applying the Forward Confusion Factors 
“While no one factor of the Polaroid test is dispositive to any one 
forward confusion case, a plaintiff that successfully argues more factors in 
its favor will prove a likelihood of confusion and ultimately win the 
case.”80  Although courts use different tests, the tests are mainly 
                                                          
72.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 23:124. 
 
73.  Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 184 (describing how the court in Sports Authority 
examined the Polaroid factor of good faith). 
 
74.  See Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 954 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 
75.  Mobil Oil Corp., 818 F.2d at 259. 
 
76.  Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc., 281 F.2d 755, 758 (2d Cir. 
1960). 
 
77.  Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 184 (describing how the court in Sports Authority 
examined the Polaroid factor of quality of defendant’s products). 
 
78.  See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 
1986). 
79.  Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 184. 
 
80.  Id. at 185. 
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harmonious.81  One might imagine that if each circuit greatly differed in its 
test, there would be more forum shopping to find a favorable result, but 
there is no evidence of this. 
Courts face a problem when they apply the consumer confusion 
factors designed for forward confusion cases to reverse confusion cases.82  
Forward confusion involves two “equal litigants,” and as such, the 
Polaroid factors are adequate to deal with this scenario.83  In contrast, 
“because the reverse confusion doctrine involves a smaller, weaker senior 
user, the Polaroid factors, on their face, are not an adequate test for these 
cases.”84 
B. Reverse Confusion 
Reverse confusion occurs “when a consumer mistakenly believes that 
both products are manufactured by or associated with the junior user.”85  
This problem arises when a larger, more powerful user adopts a trademark 
of a smaller, less powerful user, and therefore causes confusion as to the 
origin of the senior trademark user’s goods or services.86  The harm from 
reverse confusion is the same as forward confusion to the extent that both 
involve “attempts to misappropriate another’s talents.”87  Further, reverse 
confusion imposes the additional harm of depriving the senior user “the 
advertising value of its name” on the wrongly identified good, as well as 
the goodwill that would ordinarily come from the public’s knowledge of 
                                                          
81.  See Christina P. Mott, Note, Multifactors, Multiconfusion? Refining “Likelihood of 
Confusion” Factors for Reverse-Confusion Trademark Infringment Claims to Achieve More 
Consistent and Predictable Results, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 438–39 (2014). 
 
82.  Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 186 (“Specifically, there is no one test that exists 
uniformly throughout the nation’s courts with which to properly analyze a ‘reverse confusion’ 
claim.”). 
 
83.  Id. 
 
84.  Id. 
 
85.  Scholer, supra note 35, at 737. 
 
86.  JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 430 (5th ed. 2013).  
 
87.  See Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Application of Doctrine of “Reverse Passing Off” 
Under Lanham Act, 194 A.L.R. FED. 175, 187–88 (2004).  
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the true identity of the desired good.88  Moreover, the ultimate purchaser of 
the product is harmed by the loss of knowledge as to, and possible 
deception regarding, the true source of the good.89 
The phenomenon of reverse confusion originally caused difficulties 
for the courts, which did not recognize reverse confusion as an actionable 
claim until the later half of the twentieth century.90  Although the concept 
of reverse confusion was first alluded to as early as 1918, it was not 
judicially accepted until nearly sixty years later in 1977.91  In 1968, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed, but ultimately rejected, 
reverse confusion as a doctrine in Westward Coach Manufacturing Co. v. 
Ford Motor Co..92  There, Westward Coach Manufacturing Company 
(“Westward”) marketed its campers and trailers under breeds of horses, 
such as “Pinto” and “Mustang.”93  Westward first used the name 
“Mustang” in 1960, and by 1967 the mark was federally registered.  When 
Ford Motor Company (“Ford”), the leading car company in the nation at 
the time, came out with its “Mustang” sports car in 1962, Ford refused to 
rename it after learning of Westward’s mark.94  Ford subsequently ran large 
advertisements that referred to its trucks as “Camper Specials,” adding to 
the confusion.95  Although the facts plainly reflect a case of reverse 
                                                          
88.  Id. at 188. 
 
89.  Id. 
 
90.  See Mott, supra note 81, at 442. 
 
91.  Molly S. Cusson, Note, Reverse Confusion: Modifying the Polaroid Factors to 
Achieve Consistent Results, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 179, 186 (1995); Int’l 
News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 247 (1918) (Holmes, J., concurring) (asserting 
that, in the ordinary case, the defendant is passing off their product as the plaintiff’s, but the same 
harm can occur vice versa, from the plaintiff falsely passing off its product as the defendant’s).  
 
92.   Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 388 F.2d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 1968) 
(holding that reverse confusion is not an actionable claim); see also Mott, supra note 81, at 442 
n.97; Brent Folsom, Reverse Confusion: Fundamentals and Limits, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 258, 259 (2001) (“Although these facts suggest a textbook reverse confusion case, the 
Seventh Circuit rejected Westward’s reverse confusion claim as possessing ‘no rational basis for 
support.’”).  
 
93.  Westward Coach Mfg., 388 F.2d at 630.  
 
94.  Id. 
 
95.  Id. at 630–31. 
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confusion, the Seventh Circuit rejected the claim, holding that because 
Westward’s mark was weak and only for trailers and campers, Westward 
had no claim against Ford for using the mark on a different good.96  In 
ruling so, the court completely missed the “mark” on reverse confusion.  
The smaller size of Westward’s campaign, though dwarfed by Ford’s, did 
not dispel the fact that Westward had a federally registered, protectable 
mark.  Accordingly, the court should have continued to analyze whether 
there was a likelihood of consumer confusion. 
In the 1977 landmark case Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co., the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized reverse 
confusion as a doctrine and established the legal principle that a subsequent 
user of a mark (typically a larger user) could be held liable for infringement 
to an original user (typically a smaller user).97  The Big O Tire court, 
however, did not establish a test for analyzing reverse confusion claims.98  
Since the Big O Tire decision, all circuit courts have recognized and 
adopted the doctrine of reverse confusion.99 
1.  Why Reverse Confusion Was Not Originally Recognized 
At first, courts did not readily recognize reverse confusion because 
the doctrine is counterintuitive to the idea that the junior user, acting as the 
typically weaker user, would want to target the goodwill created by the 
stronger senior user’s mark.100  In reverse confusion cases, however, the 
strength of the users is flipped.  Because the junior user is the wealthier and 
more powerful user in such a case, the junior user has no desire to 
capitalize on the senior user’s less established goodwill.101  This fact hurt 
                                                          
96.  Id. at 635. 
 
97.  Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 
1977) (holding that reverse confusion is actionable); see also Mott, supra note 81, at 442 
(discussing the Big O Tire opinion); Folsom, supra note 92, at 259 (“The modern track for 
reverse confusion doctrine was laid by the landmark case Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co.”). 
 
98.  Big O Tire Dealers, 561 F.2d at 1371–72; Mott, supra note 81, at 442 (explaining that 
the Big O Tire court did not create a framework for reverse confusion cases other than the typical 
forward confusion framework).  
 
99.  Mott, supra note 81, at 442. 
 
100.  See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 957 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
 
101.  Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 480 (3d Cir. 1994) 
SET THE STATUTES STRAIGHT (DO NOT DELETE) 1/28/2016  5:22 PM 
88 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1 
the senior user’s claim; without the intent to trade on the senior user’s 
goodwill, courts were not willing to recognize a junior user’s bad intent in 
adopting the mark.102  Furthermore, by virtue of the senior user being the 
lesser-known user, the commercial strength of its mark would be deemed 
weaker than the junior user’s.103  Consequently, in analyzing the strength of 
the mark, the senior user would lose.104 
The confusion that the senior user’s mark is affiliated with the well-
recognized junior user also makes it less likely that the senior user suffered 
harm by a loss in sales (indeed, sales may have increased because of the 
mistaken affiliation).105  Nevertheless, reverse confusion still harms the 
senior user by diminishing the value of the senior user’s trademark, diluting 
the senior user’s product identity and corporate identity, stripping much of 
the senior user’s control over its goodwill or reputation, and negatively 
affecting the senior user’s ability to move into new markets.106  Once courts 
started recognizing that a weaker senior user was in fact harmed by a junior 
user’s adoption of its mark, reverse confusion became actionable.107 
One of the problems in developing a coherent reverse confusion 
analysis is that the Polaroid court listed the forward confusion factors, but 
never defined them (even in the forward confusion analysis).108  Hence, the 
                                                          
(“[T]he junior user [in a reverse confusion case] does not seek to trade on the good will and name 
of the senior user; instead he overwhelms it.”).  
 
102.  See id. at 479–80 (concluding the relevant inquiry in reverse confusion is not the 
junior user’s intent to appropriate the senior user’s goodwill, but rather the junior user’s 
carelessness toward confusion in adopting the mark). 
 
103.  See, e.g., id. at 479. 
 
104.  Id. (“[I]n a case of reverse confusion, the evidence of commercial strength is 
different from what we expect in a case of forward confusion, where the junior user tries to palm 
off his goods as those of the senior user. . . . In reverse confusion, the junior user is typically a 
wealthier, more powerful company who can overwhelm the market with advertising. An 
aggressive junior user may thereby achieve greater commercial strength in a short period of time 
than the senior user has after years of marketing its product.”). 
 
105.  Joel R. Feldman, Note, Reverse Confusion in Trademarks: Balancing the Interests of 
the Public, the Trademark Owner, and the Infringer, 8 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 163, 169 (2003).  
 
106.  Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 957–58. 
 
107.  Fisons Horticulture, 30 F.3d at 474–75. 
 
108.  Cusson, supra note 91, at 196. 
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means for applying the factors have “subsequently been developed and 
defined throughout case law in each of the circuits, thereby producing 
inconsistent results.”109  Another problem arises when courts use the 
forward confusion factors for reverse confusion claims since, as this Note 
discussed, the two situations confront distinct issues.110  “While some 
circuit courts analyzing instances of reverse confusion apply a similar 
framework to that used in forward-confusion cases, only recently have all 
circuits recognized the reverse-confusion phenomenon, and some have no 
framework in place whatsoever to analyze these cases.”111 
2. Reverse Confusion Factors as Applied 
As previously noted, each circuit court has its own analysis of factors 
for reverse confusion.112  For example, in 1995, the Second Circuit 
determined that, for purposes of reverse confusion, it is the junior user’s 
commercial strength and the junior user’s bad faith efforts in investigating 
previous use of the mark and/or knowledge of such use that is particularly 
important.113  Then, in 1998, the Second Circuit held that reverse confusion 
was actionable under the Lanham Act in Banff, Ltd. v. Federated 
Department Stores, Inc..114  Establishing reverse confusion as an actionable 
doctrine is a significant development because the power imbalance between 
the senior and junior users is addressed to reach a just result. 
In 1994, the Third Circuit in Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro 
Industry, Inc. stated, “Although we have not yet adopted the doctrine of 
                                                          
109.  Id.   
 
110.  Id. at 197 (applying forward confusion factors to reverse confusion situations 
“overlook[s] that the two are distinct from one another and, as such, should not be identically 
analyzed”). 
 
111.  Mott, supra note 81, at 442. 
 
112.  Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 186–202. 
 
113.  Sunenblick v. Harrell, 895 F. Supp. 616, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 101 F.3d 684 
(2d Cir. 1996) (“[I]n a reverse confusion case, exactly which trademark is the relevant one to 
examine when considering the strength of the mark?  The court holds that it is logical to examine 
the strength of the junior user’s mark.”). 
 
114.  Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[W]e 
hold that reverse confusion—perhaps the primary type of confusion involved in this case—is 
actionable under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.”). 
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reverse confusion in a trademark case, we do so here.”115  The court went 
on to use its forward confusion test116 with three exceptions applicable to 
reverse confusion cases.117  The exceptions analyze both the strength of the 
mark and the junior user’s good faith.118  First, in reverse confusion, the 
commercial strength of the senior user’s mark is not as important as it is in 
forward confusion.119  Rather, it is the commercial strength of the junior 
user’s mark that is of importance.120  Second, the court found that because 
the junior user’s mark is usually commercially stronger than the senior 
user’s mark, the inherent strength (i.e., distinctiveness) of the senior user’s 
mark should be given more consideration than its commercial strength.121  
Finally, the court concluded that because the junior user is not trying to 
benefit from the senior user’s goodwill, the good faith intent factor in 
reverse confusion should be analyzed as whether the junior user was 
“careless” in its search of previous users of a similar trademark and 
whether the junior user followed through with its investigation if it found 
there were such companies.122  Despite these promising exceptions set forth 
by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, at least two district courts (within the 
circuit) that subsequently heard reverse confusion cases have disregarded 
the precedent.123 
                                                          
115.  Fisons Horticulture, 30 F.3d at 475. 
 
116.  POLLACK, supra note 47, § 14 (“The Third Circuit uses the 10 Lapp factors.”) (citing 
Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.3d 460 (3d Cir. 1983)). 
 
117.  See Fisons Horticulture, 30 F.3d at 475–81. 
 
118.  Id. at 478–80. 
 
119.  Id. at 478–79. 
 
120.  Id. 
 
121.  See id. at 479 (“The district court, in treating this case like one of forward confusion, 
put great emphasis on the lack of commercial strength of Fisons’ mark and virtually none on its 
distinctiveness.  In reverse confusion, the mark of the senior user is typically weaker 
commercially than that of the junior user.  On remand, the strength of Fisons’ mark will have to 
be reevaluated in light of our adoption of reverse confusion and its distinctiveness as well as its 
commercial strength will have to be considered.”). 
 
122.  Id. at 480 (concluding that the appropriate intent inquiry here is more akin to the one 
identified in Lapp: “while it may have acted innocently, was [the junior user] careless in not 
conducting a thorough name search for American uses of the name”? (citing Lapp, 721 F.2d at 
463)). 
 
123.  Del Pizzo, supra note 38, at 188 & n.69 (collecting district court cases within the 
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The Seventh Circuit recognized reverse confusion as a redressable 
injury in 1992 in Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co..124  There, 
the court took its forward confusion seven-factor likelihood of confusion 
test125 and developed two tweaks to be used in reverse confusion cases.126  
First, similar to the Third Circuit, the Seventh Circuit stated that it is the 
commercial strength of the junior user’s mark that is important rather than 
the commercial strength of the senior user’s mark.127  Second, the court 
postulated that when determining the “bad faith” factor, the question to be 
asked is whether the junior user knew of the senior user’s use of the mark, 
but proceeded to use it anyway as a showing of bad faith.128 
In 1994, the Eighth Circuit held that the Lanham Act’s likelihood of 
confusion language was broad enough to encompass reverse confusion.129  
However, the court did not give guidance regarding the reverse confusion 
analysis.130  In the 1997 case Dream Team Collectibles, Inc. v NBA 
Properties, Inc., the district court, pursuant to the Eighth Circuit’s 
recognition of reverse confusion, took its six-factor forward confusion 
                                                          
Third Circuit disregarding the Fisons Horticulture analysis).  
 
124.  Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 958. 
 
125.  POLLACK, supra note 47, § 14 (“The Seventh Circuit lists seven factors: (1) the 
similarity of the marks; (2) the similarity of the products; (3) the area and manner of concurrent 
use; (4) the degree of care likely to be used by consumers; (5) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; 
(6) whether any actual confusion exists; and (7) the defendant’s intent to palm off its goods as 
those of the plaintiff.”) (citing Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir 
2002)). 
 
126.  Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 959–61. 
 
127.  Id. at 959 (“In a reverse confusion case, then, it may make more sense to consider 
the strength of the mark in terms of its association with the junior user’s goods.”); see also 
Buckman, supra note 34, at 292.  
 
128.  See Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 961 (“In a reverse confusion case, of course, 
the defendant by definition is not palming off or otherwise attempting to create confusion as to 
the source of his product.  Thus, the ‘intent’ factor of the likelihood of confusion analysis is 
essentially irrelevant in a reverse confusion case.  As the district court noted, however, ‘[a] 
finding of fraudulent intent or bad faith is not essential to prove infringement where likelihood of 
confusion already exists.’”). 
 
129.  Minn. Pet Breeders, Inc. v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242, 1246 (8th Cir. 
1994). 
 
130.  Id. 
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test131 and altered it for reverse confusion cases.132  Much like the Third and 
Seventh Circuits, the Eighth Circuit held that the junior user’s commercial 
strength is relevant to the analysis, over the senior user’s commercial 
strength, and that the junior user’s bad faith should be examined to 
determine if the junior user searched for or knew of the senior user’s mark 
prior to adoption.133  The Eighth Circuit further observed that the 
relatedness of the products is not as significant a factor in a reverse 
confusion case because the consumers might associate the smaller plaintiff 
senior user’s mark with the larger defendant user’s mark, even on unrelated 
products.134 
Even with developing recognition of reverse confusion, there are 
circuits that do not have a workable framework for these cases, resulting in 
judicial inconsistencies.135  For instance, in 1987 the Sixth Circuit 
recognized reverse confusion in Ameritech, Inc. v. American Information 
Technologies Corp., stating that Ohio had a long history of protecting 
trademark owners from forward confusion and the same policy interests are 
involved in reverse confusion.136  The appellate court explained, “The 
senior user’s interests in the trademark can be suffocated by the junior user 
who takes the trademark as his own; and consumers can be confused that 
the senior user’s products come from the junior user or that the senior has 
                                                          
131.  POLLACK, supra note 47, § 14 (“The Eighth Circuit lists six factors: (1) the strength 
of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the similarity between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks; (3) the 
degree to which the allegedly infringing product competes with the plaintiff’s goods; (4) the 
alleged infringer’s intent to confuse the public; (5) the degree of care reasonably expected of 
potential customers; and (6) evidence of actual confusion.” (citing SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 
F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1980))).  
 
132.  Dream Team Collectibles, Inc. v. NBA Props., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1401, 1411 (E.D. 
Mo. 1997) (“The test for infringement remains likelihood of confusion.  Nevertheless, the Court’s 
analysis of the . . . factors must be modified, as necessary, in a case of reverse confusion.”). 
 
133.  Id. at 1412, 1415 (“In a reverse confusion case, analysis of a mark’s distinctiveness 
in the marketplace—its commercial strength—is of considerably less significance than in a 
forward confusion case.”). 
 
134.  Id. at 1414 (“Although the Court must analyze the degree to which goods compete in 
evaluating the likelihood of confusion, the significance of this factor may decrease in a case of 
reverse confusion.”). 
 
135.  See, e.g., Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960 (6th Cir. 1987); 
Big O Tire Dealers, 561 F.2d 1365.  
 
136.  Ameritech, 811 F.2d at 966. 
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become associated with the junior.”137  Yet, despite recognizing the distinct 
issue of a stronger secondary user, the Sixth Circuit later used the same 
analysis for forward and reverse confusion, causing inconsistent and unjust 
results.138 
In another example, as noted above, in 1977 the Tenth Circuit held 
that reverse confusion was actionable in Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Corp., but did not set forth unique analyses or 
exceptions to their forward confusion test for likelihood of confusion.139 
As each circuit applies a different analysis to reverse confusion, 
litigation results differ depending on the forum.140  The Supreme Court has 
not yet taken a case on certiorari, and thus is yet to set a definitive test for 
reverse confusion.141  Unfortunately, because not all circuits have 
developed a consistent approach,142 weaker senior users do not always get 
the protection they deserve. 
IV. WHY REVERSE CONFUSION PROTECTION IS IMPORTANT 
A clear and coherent test to analyze reverse confusion is necessary in 
order to protect senior users that are smaller, less powerful entities in 
comparison to the junior users.143  Under reverse confusion, because the 
junior user is using the same or similar trademark as the senior user, the 
public might incorrectly perceive that the senior user is trading off the 
goodwill of the junior user when it is the senior user who was the first to 
use the mark.144  “The result is that the senior user loses the value of the 
                                                          
137. Id. 
 
138.  Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 631 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying 
the forward confusion factors analysis to a case of reverse confusion). 
 
139.  See generally Big O Tire Dealers, 561 F.2d 1365.  
 
140.  See Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 958 n.12. 
 
141.  See id. 
 
142.  See Mott, supra note 81, at 443–44. 
 
143.  See Nancy Del Pizzo, Comment, Developing a Uniform Test for “Reverse 
Confusion” Trademark Cases in the Sports & Entertainment Industries, 14 SETON HALL J. 
SPORTS & ENT. L. 175, 186 (2004). 
 
144.  Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 957 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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trademark—its product identity, corporate identity, control over its 
goodwill and reputation, and ability to move into new markets.”145 
If more powerful junior users can use and appropriate whichever 
marks they want, then the trademark protection afforded to the trademark 
holder’s goodwill would be worthless to smaller users.146  Furthermore, if 
reverse confusion is not properly addressed, there would be no incentive 
for junior users to pay senior users for the right to use their trademark—it is 
cheaper to infringe when the senior user has no actionable basis.147  If the 
law were limited to situations of traditional trademark infringement, i.e., 
forward confusion, anyone with adequate size and resources could adopt 
any mark and develop a new meaning for it as identification of its own 
products.148 
Without redressability for reverse confusion, not only are weaker 
senior users harmed, but consumers are as well.149  If the junior user’s 
goods are of inferior quality to that of the senior user, then confused 
consumers will associate the inferiority with the senior user’s mark and 
may never have the confusion dispelled.150  The confusion then hurts the 
senior user further by turning the senior user’s mark “from an asset of 
goodwill into a liability of ill will” when the consumers believe that the 
senior user is passing off the junior user’s goods as its own.151 
Reverse confusion results in precisely the type of harm to trademark 
                                                          
145.  Id. 
 
146.  111 MALLA POLLACK, AM. JUR. TRIALS, § 7 (2009) (“[R]everse confusion protects 
smaller senior users . . . against larger, more powerful companies who want to use identical or 
confusingly similar trademarks. . . . Absent reverse confusion, a company with a well established 
trade name and with the economic power to advertise extensively would be immunized from suit 
for a product name taken from a competitor.”).  
 
147.  See id. (“[W]ithout the existence of such a [reverse confusion] claim, smaller 
business owners might not have any incentive to invest in their marks at all, for fear the mark 
could be usurped at will by a larger competitor.”). 
 
148.  Deborah F. Buckman, Reverse Confusion Doctrine Under Lanham Trademark Act, 
187 A.L.R. FED. 271, 288 (2003). 
 
149.  Leah L. Scholer, Note, Righting the Wrong in Reverse Confusion, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 
737, 738 (2004). 
 
150.  Id. 
 
151.  Id. 
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owners and consumers that the Lanham Act sought to protect.152  This 
includes the protection from deception as to the source of goods, reaping 
where one has not sown, and tarnishing the goodwill and reputation of the 
senior user.153  “By failing to recognize reverse confusion or refusing to 
modify existing forward-confusion analyses, courts not only deprive many 
small businesses . . . from a cause of action to defend their marks against 
larger users, but also hinder consumers from making informed decisions in 
choosing products.”154 
As there is no consistent and clear test applied by the courts, the best 
way to dispel confusion regarding reverse confusion is through legislative 
action to amend the Lanham Act.  Amending the Act would solve two 
problems.  First, reverse confusion would be statutorily recognized as a 
separate cause of action (distinct from traditional forward confusion), and 
second, the factors for analyzing a reverse confusion claim would be fixed 
and defined (thereby establishing uniformity).155  Affording reverse 
confusion claims their own uniform test benefits all: parties would be better 
able to gage their cases and prepare for court, forum shopping would be 
deterred, and confusion among the consuming public would be reduced.156  
Perhaps most importantly, “a smaller company that invests its time, energy, 
and finances into product development, trademark procurement, and 
product launch will have a viable cause of action should a larger, more 
                                                          
152.  See 15 U.S.C § 1125 (2012); S. REP. NO. 1333, at 3 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274. 
 
153.  Scholer, supra note 149, at 742 (“Trademark protection assures that consumers 
receive an item from the intended originator, and that trademark owners retain the value of the 
resources they commit to building their mark and associated goodwill without others 
misappropriating their mark.”).  
 
154.  Christina P. Mott, Note, Multifactors, Multiconfusion?  Refining “Likelihood of 
Confusion” Factors for Reverse-Confusion Trademark Infringement Claims to Achieve More 
Consistent and Predictable Results, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 450 (2014). 
 
155.  See Molly S. Cusson, Note, Reverse Confusion: Modifying the Polaroid Factors to 
Achieve Consistent Results, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 179, 233 (1995) 
(arguing for “courts to recognize reverse confusion as its own unique legal paradigm, distinct 
from direct confusion, and to formulate a test specific for the reverse confusion situation”).  This 
Note asserts going beyond judicial recognition, to legislative action. 
 
156.  Mott, supra note 154, at 450 (“Creating and implementing a more uniform reverse-
confusion framework will not only improve judicial economy in trademark law, but will also 
reduce forum shopping and improve consumer confidence in our economic and legal systems.”).  
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powerful company poach on its mark.”157 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A. Reverse Confusion Factors as They Should be Analyzed 
For purposes of reverse confusion, once it is established that the 
senior user is a mark holder with a protectable mark, an analysis of the 
likelihood of consumer confusion should follow.  The likelihood of 
consumer confusion should be analyzed using the existing Polaroid factors, 
however some factors should be modified to deal with reverse confusion 
where the senior user is weaker and the stronger junior user is not trying to 
capitalize off of the senior user’s goodwill.158  Amending the Lanham Act 
is necessary where, as here, the circuits apply different factors for both 
traditional forward confusion and reverse confusion.  Unless amended by 
legislation, judicial attempts to adopt a uniform reverse confusion test will 
not be successful, as the courts already do not agree on a test for the more 
common forward confusion cases.159 
A reverse confusion analysis using the eight Polaroid factors to 
determine the likelihood of consumer confusion is proposed as follows.  
For factor one, strength of the mark, the courts should focus on the 
commercial strength of the junior user’s mark and not the commercial 
strength of the senior user’s mark.160  Focusing the factor in this way is 
more practical in reverse confusion; because the junior user is the stronger 
party, a senior user would therefore almost always lose on this factor.161  
                                                          
157.  Del Pizzo, supra note 143, at 207. 
 
158.  Molly S. Cusson, Note, Reverse Confusion: Modifying the Polaroid Factors to 
Achieve Consistent Results, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 179, 233–34 (1995) 
(“The best method for analyzing reverse confusion is to borrow the factors from the direct 
confusion Polaroid likelihood of confusion test and modify them to fit into the reverse confusion 
context.”).  
 
159.  See id. at 234 (observing circuit inconsistencies regarding the Polaroid factors even 
in direct confusion cases). 
 
160.  Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 959 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(“In a reverse confusion case, then, it may make more sense to consider the strength of the mark 
in terms of its association with the junior user’s goods.”); see Cusson, supra note 158, at 238. 
 
161.  Nancy Del Pizzo, Comment, Developing a Uniform Test for “Reverse Confusion” 
Trademark Cases in the Sports & Entertainment Industries, 14 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 
175, 205 (2004).  
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Focusing on the junior user’s commercial strength instead can better bring 
to light the senior user’s injury.162  Finally, a finding of a strong junior 
mark leans towards the showing of likelihood of confusion.163  However, 
the court should still look at the senior user’s inherent strength of the mark, 
as done in the usual forward confusion analysis that uses the Abercrombie 
factors.164 
Factor two, the similarity of the marks, should be analyzed in much 
the same fashion as the forward confusion analysis.  However, this factor 
should not be given too much importance.165  As the Eighth Circuit posited, 
consumers may associate the senior user’s mark with the junior user’s mark 
even if the products are completely different.166 
Factor three, proximity of the mark, should be analyzed under the 
same forward confusion analysis: observe the channels through which the 
parties buy and sell their goods and analyze “whether the products compete 
directly and share the same channel.”167 
Factor four, bridging the gap, should also be analyzed like forward 
confusion.168  If a plaintiff is unable to show that it will enter the 
defendant’s market, however, this should not be the final nail in the 
coffin.169  As the senior user in reverse confusion cases is the weaker user, 
it is likely that it is not able to or do not plan to expand.170  This is precisely 
                                                          
162.  Id.  
 
163.  See Sands, Taylor & Wood, 978 F.2d at 959. 
 
164.  Del Pizzo, supra note 161, at 205. 
 
165.  Christina P. Mott, Note, Multifactors, Multiconfusion?  Refining “Likelihood of 
Confusion” Factors for Reverse-Confusion Trademark Infringement Claims to Achieve More 
Consistent and Predictable Results, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 449 (2014). 
 
166.  Del Pizzo, supra note 161, at 205. 
 
167.  Id.; see also Mott, supra note 165, at 449. 
 
168.  See Cusson, supra note 158, at 235 (asserting no dramatic altering to reverse 
confusion is necessary because the bridging the gap factor “has been fairly consistently applied”). 
 
169.  See Del Pizzo, supra note 161, at 205–06; Cusson, supra note 158, at 235 (advising 
to analyze Bridging the Gap “in conjunction with Proximity of the Products, taking into account 
not only the stated intentions of the senior user to expand, but also the probability that the two 
products are so closely related that the consumers will perceive them as emanating from the same 
source, thereby conceptually bridging the gap in their own minds”). 
 
170.  Cusson, supra note 158, at 235. 
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why the factors for reverse confusion should be analyzed differently than 
forward confusion. 
Factor five, actual confusion, should be reviewed just as it is in 
forward confusion.171  The relevant inquiry in reverse confusion, however, 
is not whether the public believes the defendant’s goods are affiliated with 
the plaintiff, but whether the public believes that the plaintiff’s goods are 
affiliated with the defendant.172  Again, this is because in reverse confusion, 
the plaintiff is the weaker user by definition and therefore has less 
recognition, while the defendant is the stronger user and floods the market.  
Accordingly, consumers are more aware of the defendant’s goods than the 
plaintiff’s goods.173 
Factor six, good faith, should not be analyzed under the normal intent 
analysis of forward confusion.174  A widely-recognized and stronger junior 
user would not want to trade off of the senior user’s weaker goodwill.175  
Therefore, the relevant inquiries here should be whether the defendant 
conducted a search to see if the trademark was already in use, whether it 
relied on legal counsel in adopting the mark, and whether it continued to 
adopt the mark despite knowing that the senior user was already using it.176 
Factor seven, quality of the goods, should also be analyzed like 
forward confusion, inquiring whether defendant’s product is inferior 
quality and therefore tarnishing the plaintiff’s reputation.177 
Factor eight, the sophistication of the parties’ consumers, should be 
analyzed similarly to forward confusion.178  The less sophisticated the 
senior user’s consumer, the greater chance there is a likelihood of 
                                                          
171.  Id. at 239; see also Mott, supra note 165, at 449 (“Actual confusion is arguably the 
best indicator of likelihood of confusion . . . .”). 
 
172.  Dream Team Collectibles, Inc. v. NBA Props., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1401, 1415 (E.D. 
Mo. 1997) (“To establish actual confusion in a reverse confusion case, the Second Circuit has 
held that the only relevant confusion is a belief by the senior user’s purchasers or prospective 
purchasers that the senior user’s product was produced by or affiliated with the junior user.”). 
 
173.  Del Pizzo, supra note 161, at 206. 
 
174.  See Cusson, supra note 158, at 236–37. 
 
175.  Del Pizzo, supra note 161, at 206; see also Cusson, supra note 158, at 237. 
 
176.  Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 480 (3d Cir. 1994).  
 
177.  Del Pizzo, supra note 161, at 206–07.  
 
178.  Cusson, supra note 158, at 234. 
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confusion.179 
Finally, it must be highlighted that just as in forward confusion, none 
of these factors alone should be dispositive.180  Yet a plaintiff who is able 
to prove a majority of these factors should be able to evince the likelihood 
of reverse consumer confusion and ultimately prevail.181 
B. The Proposed Legislative Amendment 
The best solution to accomplishing a clear and consistent reverse 
confusion analysis is to have reverse confusion in the Lanham Act.  
Sections 32 and 43 of the Lanham Act (under “likely to cause confusion”) 
should be amended to additionally apply to situations where a weaker 
senior user finds that its goods or services are being confused with that of a 
stronger junior user.  Moreover, the Act should set forth the factors 
applicable to each type of confusion.  In reverse confusion cases, courts 
should adjust their analysis as posited in this Note.  Further statutorily 
defining the relevant considerations under each factor would be 
phenomenal, but is not essential because further inquiry, if any, would be 
specific to the facts before the court. 
Legislative action in amending the Lanham Act is the best way to 
dispel the confusion regarding reverse confusion because it would settle 
two separate but important issues.  It is imperative to establish reverse 
confusion as a separate actionable claim and under such a claim, to define 
the factors in analyzing consumer confusion.182  In this manner, the courts 
can follow a coherent uniform test, producing consistent and more 
predictable results. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Reverse confusion was first alluded to in 1918183 and was officially 
                                                          
179.  Del Pizzo, supra note 161, at 207. 
 
180.  Id. 
 
181.  Id. 
 
182.  Cusson, supra note 158, at 233. 
 
183.  Molly S. Cusson, Note, Reverse Confusion: Modifying the Polaroid Factors to 
Achieve Consistent Results, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 179, 186 (1995); Int’l 
News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 247 (1918) (Holmes, J., concurring).  
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recognized by a federal court in 1977.184  Despite all circuit courts 
recognizing the doctrine of reverse confusion in the decades following, 
there is still no uniform test or application of factors set forth to deal with 
such a claim.185  Therefore, the Lanham Act should be amended as 
proposed in this Note in order to clearly indicate that under the “likelihood 
of confusion” statute there are two separate actionable bases: forward 
confusion and reverse confusion.  Further, the Act must articulate and 
define the factors to be considered under each claim.  Legislative action in 
this way would dispel the confusion regarding reverse confusion—whether 
in the judiciary, the trademark office, or in business practices. 
 
                                                          
184.  Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 
1977) (holding that reverse confusion is actionable); see also Christina P. Mott, Note, 
Multifactors, Multiconfusion?  Refining “Likelihood of Confusion” Factors for Reverse-
Confusion Trademark Infringement Claims to Achieve More Consistent and Predictable Results, 
47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 421, 442 (2014) (discussing the Big O Tire opinion); Brent Folsom, 
Reverse Confusion: Fundamentals and Limits, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 258, 259 (2001) 
(“The modern track for reverse confusion doctrine was laid by the landmark case Big O Tire 
Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co..”). 
 
185.  See Nancy Del Pizzo, Comment, Developing a Uniform Test for “Reverse 
Confusion” Trademark Cases in the Sports & Entertainment Industries, 14 SETON HALL J. 
SPORTS & ENT. L. 175, 186–202 (2004) (discussing several circuit courts’ analyses and the 
different factors that each circuit uses in analyzing a reverse confusion case, thus causing 
confusion due to the lack of a uniform test); see also Leah L. Scholer, Note, Righting the Wrong 
in Reverse Confusion, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 737, 739 (2004) (“In direct and reverse confusion cases, 
courts use varied multifactor tests to determine whether a ‘likelihood of confusion’ exists between 
the senior and junior users’ marks.”).  
 
